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RECENT DECISIONS 
AnMIRALTY-R:rGHT TO JURY TRIAL IN CERTAIN CASES ON GREAT LAKEs-
MAfN:r:ENANCE AND CURE NOT CoNTRAar OR TORT MATrER-Libelant brought 
an action for maintenance and cure on the admiralty side of a federal district 
court in Illinois. He requested a jury trial, relying on the Act of February 20, 
1845, which provides that in certain admiralty and maritime cases arising on 
the Great Lakes relating to any matter of contract or tort, trial shall be by jury 
on the demand of either party. The trial court heard the case without a jury 
and dismissed the libel on the merits. The court of appeals held, on appeal, 
that maintenance and cure was a matter of ancient and established maritime 
law, and not a matter of contract or tort for which the libelant would be en-
titled by the statute to a jury trial. Miller v. Standard Oil Co., (7th Cir. 1952) 
199 F. (2d) 457, cert. den. 345 U.S. 945, 73 S.Ct. 836 (1953). 
Whether a claim for maintenance and cure is contractual, delictual or be-
longs to some independent category has not been clearly determined.1 Story 
saw the claim as part of the contract for compensation of the seaman.2 Though 
modem courts occasionally speak of the claim as contractual,3 more often it is 
called quasi-contractual,4 or an incident of the status of the seaman,5 or a duty 
annexed by law to the employer-employee relationship6 or to the relationship 
of the seaman to the vessel.7 By characterizing the claim as relational or quasi-
contractual the courts are able to use contract principles or ignore them as the 
occasion demands to reach a proper result. Thus, it has been held that for sur-
1 2 NoRRis, THE LA.w 011 SEAMEN §544 (1952). 
2 Harden v. Gordon, (C.C. Me. 1823) 11 Fed. Cas. 480, No. 6,047. 
3 There appears to be general agreement now that the claim does not sound in tort. 
Sperbeck v. A. L. Burbank & Co., (2d Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 449; Pacific Steamship 
Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 49 S.Ct. 75 (1928). However, a breach of the duty to 
provide maintenance and cure may give rise to a "personal injury'' within the meaning of 
the Jones Act. Cortes, Administrator v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 53 
S.Ct. 173 (1932). 
4 ". • • Implied in law as a contractual obligation. • • ." Pacific Steamship Co. v. 
Peterson, note 3 supra, at 138. " ••• the right to maintenance and cure lies on the border-
line between 'contract' and 'quasi-contract' •••• " Sperbeck v. A. L. Burbank & Co., note 3 
supra, at 452. 
5 "In its origin, maintenance and cure must be taken as an incident to the status of the 
seaman in the employment of his ship." O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 
318 U.S. 36 at 42, 63 S.Ct. 488 (1943). 
6 Cardozo characterized the claim to maintenance and cure as follows: "The duty to 
make such provision is imposed by the law itself as one annexed to the employment. Con-
tractual it is in the sense that it has its source in a relation which is contractual in origin, 
but given the relation, no agreement is competent to abrogate the incident." Cortes, Ad-
ministrator v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., note 3 supra, at 371. It is interesting to compare 
this statement with his view of the duty of the shoreside employer to provide workmen's 
compensation for his employees: "The contract creates the relation to which the law 
attaches the duty •••• " Matter of Smith v. Heine Boiler Co., 224 N.Y. 9 at 12, 119 N.E. 
878 (1918). See also Loverich v. Warner Co., (3d Cir. 1941) 118 F. (2d) 690 at 692, 
where the claim is characterized as "an inseparable incident to the relation of the parties." 
7 "Clearly, the seaman's right ••• is one imposed by law, arising out of the nature of 
his employment and his relationship to the vessel." 2 NoRRis, THE LA.w 011 SEAMEN 
§544, p. 145 (1952). 
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vival purposes, the claim sounds in contract rather than tort and hence survives 
the seaman's death.8 But another court rejected an insurance company's argu-
ment that the claim for maintenance and cure was contractual in nature and 
hence not within the coverage of a policy which indemnified the sh~powner from 
"liability' imposed by law."9 It has been held that maintenance and cure is 
either an implied-in-fact provision in the maritime contract or quasi-contractual-
implied in law-so that a municipal court given jurisdiction over contracts 
express or implied has jurisdiction over an action for maintenance and cure.10 
The decision in the principal case reflects the desire of the court to minimize 
the effect of a statute creating an exception to the general rule denying jury 
trial in admiralty proceedings, since there is no policy reason for the exception. 
The statute has a curious history.11 At the time of its passage, it was the belief 
of Congress that admiralty jurisdiction was limited to tide waters;12 cases arising 
on the Great Lakes, therefore, would be cognizable only at common law, and 
could not be transferred to the admiralty jurisdiction without carrying over the 
right to jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment. However, the Su-
preme Court later held that admiralty jurisdiction extended to lakes and navi-
gable waters;13 hence, the cases provided for by the statute were already within 
the admiralty jurisdiction and so the provision for jury trial was unnecessary to 
make the statute constitutional. Despite subsequent revisions of the Judicial 
Code, this provision for jury trial in these limited cases has been retained.14 
A seaman seeking a jury trial of his claim for maintenance and cure has 
other means of securing it. Under the saving clause of the Judiciary Act, the 
seaman may bring his action at law in a state court with a trial by jury,15 or he 
may enforce his claim on the law side of the federal district court if there is 
diversity of citizenship and the minimum jurisdictional amount of $3,000.16 
Recently two other theories for a law action in the federal court have been 
developed and both are supported by some authority. One is the theory of 
pendent jurisdiction.17 When a seaman brings a negligence action under the 
Jones Act at law, as he is permitted to do, he may couple with it a count for 
8 Sperbeck v. A. L. Burbank & Co., note 3 supra; Cheng v. Ellerman Lines, (D.C. 
N.Y. 1926) 1926 A.M.C. 1038. 
9 Dryden v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., (7th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 291. 
10 Romer v. American Export Lines, Inc., llO N.Y.S. (2d) 400 (1952). 
11 The history of the act may be found in Gillet v. Pierce, (D.C. Mich. 1875) IO 
Fed. Cas. 388, No. 5,437. 
12 The Genesee Chief, 12 How. (53 U.S.) 443 (1851), points out that this was the 
accepted English view at the time the Constitution was adopted. 
1s The Eagle, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 15 (1868). 
14 The current form of the provision appears in the Act of June 25, 1948. It reads: 
"In any case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction relating to any matter of contract or 
tort arising upon or concerning any vessel of twenty tons or upward, enrolled and licensed 
for the coasting trade, and employed in the business of commerce and navigation between 
places in different states upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes, the 
trial of all issues of fact shall be by jury if either party demands it." 28 U .S.C. (Supp. 
V, 1952) §1873. 
15 Pacific Steamship Co. v. Peterson, note 3 supra. 
10 4 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY, 6th ed., §612 (1941). 
17 Under this theory when a federal court has acquired jurisdiction of a cause of action 
by reason of a federal question, it may decide all questions raised in the case even though 
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maintenance and cure, if the facts supporting the count for maintenance and 
cure and the one for negligence are substantially the same.18 The justification 
for such a procedure is practical rather than theoretical, since it may result in 
a saving of time, expense, and double litigation. The other theory is set forth 
in Doucette v. Vincent, 19 where it was held that a claim for maintenance and 
cure raises a federal question within the meaning of section 1331 of the Judicial 
Code granting jurisdiction to the federal district courts where the matter in 
controversy exceeds $3,000 "and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties 
of the United States." The general maritime law was incorporated into the 
Constitution by the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the federal 
courts. Under the doctrine laid down in Southern Pacific v. Jensen,20 when a 
suit is brought in state court by virtue of the saving clause, the substantive right 
of the parties must be determined by the federal maritime law. The conclusion 
reached in Doucette v. Vincent from these principles was that a case brought 
by virtue of the saving clause is a case "arising under the Constitution." In the 
Third Circuit, however, it has been held that the federal question raised in a 
claim for maintenance and cure is not sufficient to ground original jurisdiction 
in the district courts.21 It does seem somewhat far-fetched to say that all rights 
under the general admiralty law are constitutional rights merely because the 
grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts is an implied adoption of 
the general maritime law. The extension of federal question jurisdiction to 
admiralty matters would provide plaintiffs a means of coupling the advantages 
of the federal court system with trial by jury in those cases where diversity is 
lacking. Whether or not the Supreme Court will see fit to complicate the field 
of seamen's rights and remedies further by approving this theory remains to be 
seen.22 
Richard B. Barnett, S.Ed.. 
the federal question is decided adversely to the party raising it, and the case is ultimately 
decided on non-federal grounds. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 53 S.Ct. 586 (1933). 
18 Nolan v. General Seafoods Corp., (1st Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 515; Stevens v. 
R. O'Brien & Co., Ost Cir. 1933) 62 F. (2d) 632; Bay State Dredging & Contracting Co. 
v. Porter, (1st Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 827; Hern v. Moran Towing & Transportation 
Co., (2d Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 900. One judge who has followed this practice says that 
the results have been satisfactory but expresses doubt as to whether in theory it was per-
missible. "Yet, unless the theory of pendent jurisdiction be expanded, it seems to me that 
all of us have acted erroneously. • • • At any rate, as at present advised I cannot see that 
what we have done has ever been explicitly approved by the Supreme Court of the United 
States." McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp., (D.C. Mass. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 888 at 
892. 
10 (1st Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 834. 
20244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524 (1917). 
21 Jordine v. Walling, (3d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 662. 
22 This theory is fully discussed in a note at 66 HARv. L. Rnv. 315 (1952). 
